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A simple look at the performance of the Brazilian Disability Benefits on the last years
would puzzle any observer and raise number of questions. What caused the abrupt
increment in the number of benefits after 2001? Given that, what are (if there is any) the
disincentives created by the current rules of the system? This paper will study the impact
of the existence of a Public Social Security System which provides disability insurance
benefits on the labor market. The empirical strategy will be based on the system’s rule
that covers only formal sector workers and it will take advantage of the considerate
proportion of workers on informal jobs in the Brazilian labor market. The results reveal
that workers in the formal sector have higher probability to be on leave, even after
controlling for health conditions, which suggests the degree of disincentive created by
such social protection system.
Analisar a performace dos benefícios de auxílio-doença no Brasil nos últimos anos intriga
qualquer observador e levanta uma série de questões. O que causou tamanho aumento no
número de benefícios depois de 2001? Considerando estes fatos, quais são (se existe
algum) os desincentivos criados pelas regras atuais do sistema? Este trabalho irá estudar
o impacto da existência de um sistema de previdência social que propicia auxílio-doença.
A estratégia empírica será baseada nas regras do sistema que somente cobre trabalhadores
do setor formal e irá tirar vantagem do enorme setor informal do mercado de trabalho
brasileiro. Os resultados revelam que trabalhadores do setor formal têm maior
probabilidade de estar afastado do trabalho, mesmo após controlar-se pelas condições de
saúde, o que sugere o grau de desincentivo criado por tal sistema de proteção.
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1. Introduction
A simple look at the performance of the Brazilian Disability Benefits on the last
years would puzzle any observer and raise number of questions. What caused the abrupt
increment in the number of benefits after 2001? Given that, what are (if there is any) the
disincentives created by the current rules of the system?
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There are some possible explanations, structural and non-structural reasons, for
such increment on these benefits. They include a government resolution
1, which affected
the rules about the medical procedures to evaluate DI claims; the New Old Age/ Length
of Contribution Benefit Formula (that created the “Fator Previdenciário”), which may
have stimulated after 1999, requirements of disability related benefits, as an alternative
source of income
2; INSS
3 workers’ strikes that explain some punctual jumps in the
                                                
1 The INSS Resolution n.60/2001 in September of 2002 abolished the necessity to homologate medical
exams and gave the power of the final decision to the doctors, which now wouldn’t have to subject their
decision to anyone else. Even though the Resolution n.60/2001 was revoked in September of 2002, it was
maintained the lack of necessity to homologate medical exams. It remains to conclude if such alteration in
these operational rules represents an upgrade in the efficiency of the process, resulting in a faster provision
of services, or if such Resolution opened a hole on the legislation and allowed fraud and the grant of
unnecessary benefits.
2 Due to the fact that old age benefits were now under rules that would propitiate higher payments for those
who retired latter. The “Fator” rewarded (longer) years of contribution and resulted in a smaller
replacement ratio relative to the previous replacement ratio of 100%. This possible explanation could be3
number of granted benefits after the end of the strike. Concerned with this problem, the
Brazilian Government attempted to introduce some marginal reforms on the bureaucratic
concession process trying to increase efficiency of the system, since deeper reforms on
the Social Security are a political challenge to any government
4.
A number of researchers have sought to explain the interaction between social
insurance programs and labor force participation. Most of the literature on Disability
Insurance (DI) disincentive effects studies the American system and the results are
defined by the peculiarities of its program design. The different methodology
implemented on the various studies contributes significantly to the discussion of the
problem. However, to address the same disincentive issue in Brazil, the methodology
usually employed cannot be replicated due to the lack of data.
For that reason, this paper will address this issue in a slightly different way and it
will end up answering another important and interesting question. It will examine the
impact of the existence of a Public Social Security System which provides disability
insurance benefits on the labor market and the results would suggest the degree of the
disincentive effects of such benefits. The empirical strategy will be based on the system’s
rule that covers only formal sector workers and it will take advantage of the considerate
proportion of workers on informal jobs in the Brazilian labor market.
Therefore, this paper attempts to signalize some possible disincentives created by
the system based on the differences between formal sector and informal sector’ workers
behavior. Since only formal sector worker are beneficed by the system, a comparison
between formal and informal sector workers with same health conditions concerning
absence in the job could signalize that DI benefits encourage workers to leave
momentarily the job market.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes briefly the Brazilian Social
Security Disability System and shows some statistics that help to illustrate current
situation and motivate the study. Section 3 presents a literature review describing how the
topic has been analyzed by other researchers. The next two sections describe the data and
methodology employed to address the issue. The sixth section brings some results
signalizing that formal sector workers, covered by the system, tend to be “on leave” and
take advantage of the Disability Insurance (DI) more frequently than informal sector
workers. The last section signalizes future steps of this research.
2. Disability Insurance Benefits: Rules of the System
The Disability Program in the Brazilian Pension System comprises three main
classes of benefits: sickness benefit, disability pension and occupational injury benefit,
which itself encloses a sickness benefit, a disability pension and an accident
                                                                                                                                                
justified by the sharp difference in the disability pension’s behavior and by the change in the age-
distribution of this kind of benefit after 1999. However, this is just speculation since there is no way to
confirm that there was really an intentional transfer from regular retirement benefits to disability ones. The
only possible action to be taken to avoid the grant of unnecessary disability pensions is to improve the
medical investigation procedures, action crucial to develop the system as a whole.
3 INSS stands for Instituto Nacional de Seguridade Social; it is the national institute which controls the
Social Security System.
4 Deliberalli (2004)4
compensation benefit. Moreover, the law guarantees rehabilitation for totally or partial
incapable beneficiaries and habilitation to handicapped workers.
•  Sickness Benefit
Workers become eligible to the sickness benefit if disease results in incapacity to
work. It is a temporary benefit and its payment starts after 16 days of absence or after the date
the benefit was claimed if there is more than 30 days difference between this date and the
beginning of the absence period. The first 15 days of absence are paid by the employee. The
vesting period is 12 months and the benefit corresponds to 91% of “salário-de-benefício
5”.
There is no maximum period of payment of this benefit specified by law, even though
sickness benefit is considered a temporary benefit.
•  Disability Pension
Workers become eligible if considered incapable to undertake activity to guarantee
his/her financial support and is considered unsuitable for rehabilitation. As in the sickness
benefit, employees pay the first 15 days of absence and the benefit’s payment starts after the
end of sickness benefit’s payment. If there was no anterior sickness benefit, the payment may
starts after 16 days of absence or after the date the benefit was claimed if there is more than
30 days difference between this date and the beginning of the absence period. The vesting
period is 12 months and the benefit corresponds to 100% of “salário-de-benefício”.
Moreover, the benefit value is supplemented by 25% if beneficiary necessitates constant
personal care.
•  Occupational Injury Benefits
The system of occupational injury benefits encloses a sickness benefit, a
disability pension and an accident compensation benefit. For the first two kinds of
benefits, the benefits are calculated at the same way as described before. The
difference in the case of work-related benefits is that there is no vesting period.
Considering the accident compensation benefit, workers become eligible if work
related accident result in diminished work capacity. It is independent of any other
remuneration and starts after the end of the sickness benefit payment. It corresponds to 50%
of “salário-de-benefício”, it can’t be paid when worker receives any kind of
retirement/disability pension but it is incorporated to the wage when the calculation of the
retirement
•  Professional Rehabilitation
The law guarantees rehabilitation for totally or partially incapable
beneficiaries and habilitation to handicapped workers, including the supply of
prosthesis and instruments that could attenuate the loss of capacity or mobility.
In order to relocate and guarantee the participation on the labor market of the
disable workers, the government requires that firms with more than 100 employees
have to fulfill between 2% and 5%, depending on the number of employees
6, of their
                                                
5 “Salário-de-Benefício” is the base for all the benefits of the Social Security System. For the Disability
Benefits, “salário-de-benefício” is the average of the 80% highest wages/remuneration since July 1994. The
Government is trying to change this formula for some disability related benefits as it will be discussed later.
However, nothing was approved by Congress yet.
6 Firms need to fulfill their labor force with disable and rehabilitee workers by the following rule:
From 100 to 200 employees: 2%
From 201 to 500 employees: 3%
From 501 to 1000 employees: 4%
More than 1000 employees: 5%5
labor force with disable and rehabilitee workers. However, it is necessary investigate
to what extent this rule is obeyed by the firms and what are the penalties for its non-
compliance.
It worth mention that all the benefits are inflation indexed and are updated once a
year using the Consumer Price National Index (INPC). Moreover, there is an inferior
limit for the benefits equal to the minimum wage.
This paper is concerned with Sickness benefits and Occupational Injury Benefits
and, to use the standard terminology ones find on literature, it calls both of them as
Disability Insurance (DI) Benefits.
3. Literature Review
This section will summarize some studies on the disability insurance (DI)
disincentive effects on the USA, describing the characteristics of the American system.
The main differences between the American and the Brazilian system and data
availability will be emphasized in order to justify the methodology applied on this paper.
The major problem in identifying disincentive effects of DI programs is the
absence of information about potential labor supply of beneficiaries and the main
methodological problem faced by researchers when addressing these impacts on labor
force participation (LFP) is the endogeneity of DI benefit receipt. Participation on DI
programs is a combination of individual decisions to apply for the program and
individual’s characteristics which define worker’s eligibility to the program. Therefore,
the outcome, i.e. be awarded with a DI benefit cannot be treated as exogenous variable in
a labor force participation equation.
To deal with this endogeneity problem, some studies tried to model LFP as a
function of potential benefit levels to wage, known as the replacement rate. However, this
method presents some problems as well. Depending on the mechanism of benefit
calculation, the replacement ratio may differ among workers with different wage levels
and work history. Then, since benefit depends on past wages, it depends on past work
decisions. As a result, the replacement rate cannot be considered an exogenous variable
also. Moreover, the replacement rate combines wage and benefit levels, confounding
their impact on LFP.
The brief description of the American system follows Chen and Van der Klaauw
(2006). The American network protection for the disable comprehends two federal
programs: the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Program and the Supplement
Security Income (SSI) program. The SSDI program is part of the Old-Age Survivor and
Disability Program funded mainly through payroll taxes (all workers contribute to the
SSDI trust fund through their Social Security taxes). Eligibility is conditioned on
previous sufficient employment in jobs covered by Social Security. The SSI program
provides a minimum level of income to needy aged and disables individuals subject to an
earning and assets test, not requiring previous employment.
Programmatic reforms in USA in 1984 expanded the original narrow mandate of
the DI program to encompass a broader population with a less precisely defined
entitlement to benefits. Moreover, the advances of medical treatments and rehabilitation6
process turned the frontier between "permanently and totally disable" and "disable but
with some work capacity" subtler than ever. The combination of these medical and
rehabilitation advances and looser entitlement rules resulted then in an increase of DI
benefits, rather than a decrease that would be expected from the medical and work
condition improvements.
 American disability determination process is based on medical and vocational
factors such age, education and past employment, all used to determine individual’s
ability to work. After going through nonmedical criteria
7, severity assessment
8 evaluates
if applicant has an impairment that meets a specific codified clinical criteria relating both
nature and severity of impairment, which defines benefit award. If benefit is not awarded,
the next step is to evaluate applicant’s ability to work, based on his/her characteristics
including health conditions. If offices concluded that the applicant cannot work, then
benefit is awarded. It is evaluated the individual’s ability to perform the job he had before
the onset of the disability and the applicant’s residual functional capacity to work as well.
If he is considered able to perform his past job, benefit is denied. If he is considered
unable to perform his past job, than he moves to the next stage where the residual
functional capacity determined before is combined with vocational characteristics as age,
education and work experience to determine if applicant can carry out alternative types of
work in the economy, other than the one he has held. A grid is provided to guide on the
decision. The grid regulations, formalized in 1978, relate certain workers characteristics
such as age, education and past work experience to the individual’s residual capacity to
perform work-related physical and mental activities. Individuals are characterized into
different age groups (under age 45, 45 to 49, 50 to 54, and 55 and over) and in different
residual functional capacity of the worker (sedentary, light or medium) determined
previously based on medical conditions, and person’s experience and skill level. When
applicant’s request is denied, it is possible to appeal
 Disability rolls grew in USA mostly due to liberalization of the screening process
that shifted the composition of beneficiaries toward claimants with lower mortality
disorders. Legislation changes in 1984 which expanded the definition of disability to
consider not only health impairments but to consider “ability to function in a work-like
setting”, shifted the focus from medical criteria only to functional criteria, affecting
considerably the decision making. Moreover, the rising financial incentives to apply for a
disability award and changes in labor force participation that increase the share of
citizens insured are additional contributors for disability rolls growth. An interaction
between the disability benefit formula and the growth of earnings inequality in the US
economy resulted in substantial replacement rates increments. Replacement rate increases
for some specific group of workers which saw their real wage drop sharply suggests that
DI became more attractive to these workers.
A series of studies have attempted to evaluate the work capability of DI claimants
and measure the degree of disincentive attributed to the DI programs in USA.
                                                
7 Nonmedical criteria: to be eligible, individuals must be under 65 (and now 67 for those born in 1960 or
later), must have worked for at least 5 of the last 10 years and cannot be "engaged in a substation gainful
activity” (no more than $860 monthly earnings in 2006).
8 Impairment is considered to be severe if it meets the duration test, i.e. the impairment is expected to last at
least 12 months, or result in death, and significantly limits the physical or mental ability of an individual to
perform his work-related activities.7
Parson (1980) modeled labor force participation as a function of replacement
rates, demographic and health characteristics. He compared labor force participation rates
of those with high and low replacement rates. The difference in participation rates among
these two groups is taken to be an estimate of DI’s impact or disincentive. However, as
mentioned before, this strategy doesn’t consider the endogeneity of replacement ratios.
Since replacement ratios are a decreasing function of past earnings and incentive
structure, it is not possible to determine whether it is generous replacement rates or low
earnings that induced individuals to leave labor force.
Bound (1989) suggested that there is a causal connection between the availability
and generosity of DI benefits and the increasing proportion of older men leaving the labor
force in order to qualify for the benefits. And this explanation emerged from the fact that
the proportion of older men out of the labor force increased as DI benefits were growing
rapidly due to higher availability and generosity of the system. His estimation strategy
considered rejected applicant as a natural control group for the beneficiaries. He assumed
that rejected applicants are healthier and more capable of work than those who were
accepted and, therefore, their labor force participation should provide an upper bound for
what could be expected of DI beneficiaries.
The data available allows obtaining the LFP for beneficiaries (after some period
of time following benefit award) and the LFP of non-beneficiaries (after some period of
time following request denial). However, we could never observe the LFP of
beneficiaries had they not received the benefit. To better understand the methodology,
consider the general problem. Let yi be the outcome measure and ti the treatment
indicator. The treatment effect would be measures by E[ ( yi(1) – yi(0) ) / ti = 1 ]. It is
possible to observe E[yi(1) / ti = 1] and E[yi(0) / ti = 0]. However, we don’t observe
E[yi(0) / ti = 1] which hamper the determination of the treatment effect. Bound argued
that rejected applicants are generally healthier than accepted applicants, i.e.  E[yi(0) / ti =
1] < E[yi(0) / ti = 0]. For that reason, the LFP of these rejected applicants could be treated
as an upper bound for the percentage of DI beneficiaries who would have worked in the
absence of the program. Therefore, by restricting the sample to applicants only, he was
able to obtain an upper bound on the average treatment effect on the treated
| E[ ( yi(1) – yi(0) ) / ti = 1 ] | ≤ |  E[yi(1) / ti = 1] – E[yi(0) / ti = 0] |
The results showed that fewer than 50% of rejected male applicants work and
then he concludes that less than half of those on DI would work were they not receiving
benefits.
As Autor and Duggan (2006) observed, this methodology may be biased towards
underestimating the labor supply disincentive of Disability Insurance system for two
reasons: “some rejected applicants may remain out of labor force because they are
reapplying for DI while other rejected applicants may be unable to find re-employment
because their skills and opportunities deteriorated during the application process”.
Another limitation of this methodology were the fact that not disable but low skills
workers that would not be working anyways but filled applications would distort this
comparison between rejected and non-rejected claimants.
Chen and Van der Klaauw (2006) evaluate work disincentive effects of DI
programs during the 1990s. They replicate the Bound upper bound for work disincentive8
effect of the current program and subsequently they adopt a Regression-Discontinuity
approach to provide a point estimate of the impact of the DI program on a subset of
applicants. More specifically, they exploit the particularities of the determination process
that access the residual capacity of worker based on the grid causing a discontinuity on
the probability to be awarded depending on age.
Their estimates imply an upper bound on the reduction in the employment rate of
applicants associated with disability benefit receipt around 15 percentage points,
suggesting an smaller disincentive than the one estimated by Bound
9.
Exploiting the fact that about 40% of applicants for whom disability
determination was not resolved based on medical grounds and had to be based on
vocational grounds with the help of a grid, the authors used a regression-discontinuity to
evaluate disincentive effects of DI benefits on an important subset of applicants (that
reached the final stage in the screening process). They present an example of the grid
impact on disability determination to illustrate how its use leads to discontinuities in the
award rate as a function of age: “Consider an applicant who has less than a high school
education, is (semi) skilled and who cannot easily enter into another profession, and
whose disability limits her to light work. Then according to the (…) grid (…) the
applicant would be accepted if she was 55 or older at the time of the disability decision.
However, if she was less than 55 years of age at that time, she would be rejected” (Chen
and Van der Klaauw, 2006). As the individuals are of similar age when they are just
below or above the cutoff age, those just below the cutoff age can be expected to be
comparable to the individuals just above in all characteristics and consequently they are
expected to have similar labor supply responses when receiving or not DI benefits.
Therefore, the authors defend the idea that the average LFP of individuals just below the
cutoff age could be a credible estimate of the LFP of those just above the cutoff would
have been they were not awarded with the DI benefit.
They apply two different methods to estimate the average treatment effect: the
two-stage method proposed by Van der Klaauw (2002) and a local Wald estimator. The
two-stage method proposed involves the estimation of a control function augmented labor
supply equation where the DI program participation variable is replaced by a propensity
score previously estimated. Since the grid creates three potential discontinuity points, the
DI benefit impact estimated represents an estimate of a weighted average of the three
local treatment effects.
The short-run sample
10 estimate based on the two-stage approach reveals that DI
benefit receipt reduces the LFP in 20% between those applicants where the definition
about their disability status were made at the last stage of the screening process. And a
surprisingly result showed an estimate of a 6 percentage point drop in LFP due to DI
benefit receipt in the long-run sample
11 revealing that giving more time to re-entry into
the labor force is not important. “Overall the estimates imply that, depending on the
particular estimation method used, the work disincentive effects associated with DI
benefit receipt for the marginal group of stage 5 applicants were either slightly lower or
higher than those obtained using Bound’s comparison group approach, but with all
estimates representing modest impacts.”
                                                
9 Authors discuss some potential reasons for the different results. For more detail check reference.
10 Between 1 and 24 months after date of award decision.
11 Between 1 month and 11 years after date of award decision.9
The American and the Brazilian system present some significant differences,
resulting in diverse disincentive effects. The grant rule in the American and Brazilian
Social Security Systems are not the same and the degree of discouragement brought to
the labor markets will be different as well.
The Brazilian screening process does not follow so many steps to identify who is
and who isn’t disable. The decision is based on health status and capacity to carry out
worker’s “current” job. The fact that Brazilian rules require workers to be currently
enrolled in jobs covered by Social Security represents a significant difference between
the two systems. As a result, evaluate worker residual capacity to work would suggest
that applicant would have to leave current job and find another one fitted to his
possibilities, in case he is not considered unapt to perform current job.
Two potential consequences of the design differences should be considered. First,
because American system eligibility requirements are conditioned on the applicant not to
be engaged in any activity which is both “substantial and gainful”, the system as it is
could create higher incentives for non-labor participation. However, since the American
screening process final step access residual functional capacity, i.e. it verifies whether the
applicant can carry out any type of work in the economy, it could be grating benefits to
truly disable workers more frequently than the Brazilian system.
The strategy used by the papers just described could not be the approach to
analyze the disincentive effects of disability insurance benefits in the Brazilian case due
to the lack of data. Considering Brazilian data availability, this paper will address this
issue in a slightly different way but it will end up answering another important and
interesting question. This paper will examine the impact of the existence of a Public
Social Security System which provides disability insurance benefits on the labor market.
The results would suggest the degree of the disincentive effects of such benefits. The
empirical strategy will be based on the system’s rule that covers only formal sector
workers and it will take advantage of the considerate proportion of workers on informal
jobs in the Brazilian labor market.
4. Data and Empirical Strategy
This paper uses data from the Brazilian Household Survey PNAD (Pesquisa
Nacional por Amostras de Domicílios) 2003, which brings a supplement about health
conditions. One of the biggest obstacles to be surpassed in order to address the DI
disincentive question as the literature does would be to identify workers under DI benefit,
since there is no specific question about that on PNAD. Other Brazilian Household
Surveys would allow such identification but would not contain satisfactory information
about posterior LFP.
However, the system only covers formal sector workers. In that sense, informal
sector workers would provide a control group for formal sector workers. Controlling for
demographic, labor sector, occupation and health conditions, formal sector workers
would have a smaller labor force participation than informal sector workers if the DI
benefit causes some disincentive to come back to the labor force or to leave it
momentarily. More specifically, the probability of a formal s e c t o r  w o r k e r  t o  b e  “ o n
leave” would be higher than the same probability for informal sector workers, controlling
for health conditions. For that reason, the comparison between formal and informal sector10
workers would bring some light to the discussion about the disincentives caused by DI
benefits.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample of formal and informal
sector workers. As it would be expected, formal and informal sector workers present
differences in almost all demographic and occupational characteristics. Workers enrolled
in formal jobs are mainly married white man, more educated than informal sector
workers. They live with their spouses and have kids, perform jobs in Manufacturing or
Services.
Considering health conditions of the sample, workers who declared themselves
with excellent health conditions belong mostly to formal sector jobs. On the other hand,
workers who declared themselves with regular, poor or very poor condition work mainly
in informal sector positions. Another interesting information reveals that more then 57%
of informal job workers declared that didn’t undertake some activity on the week before
of the survey for health reasons. Among formal sector workers, only 42.4% had the same
problem.
5. Methodology
Differences on the labor market, on the program design and on the data
availability requires an alternative methodology to address the issue of DI programs
disincentive effects. This will compromise any result comparisons with the previous
literature for the American system. However, it will hopefully contribute to the
discussion of disincentive effects of DI benefits.
The same issues faced by the analysis of DI disincentive effects concerning
endogeneity problems would be found here since it is not clear whether a causal link
between formality and LFP is identified because of standard endogeneity problems.
Under endogeneity scenario, unobserved attributes which make job formality more likely
may be correlated with LFP (a binary variable) and, therefore, a single equation estimate
of the effect of a formal job on LFP (equation 1) would be biased. The propensity to be a
formal sector worker (ti = 1) is likely to be correlated with factors that influence the LFP
or the probability of be “on leave”.
LFPi = α + βXi + γti + εi (1)
To deal with this potential bias due to unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity
problems, Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) develop the propensity score matching
estimators. In this method, each treatment unit (covered or formal sector workers) is
matched with non-treatment units (non covered or informal sector workers) under the
assumption of conditional independence, i.e. LFPi ┴ ti / Xi and common support, i.e. 0 <
Prob(ti = 1 / Xi) < 1, (Mocan and Tekin, 2002)
Each formal sector worker (treated unit) can be matched with an informal sector
worker (control unit) and the average treatment effect is calculated as the mean within-
match difference in the outcome variable (be on leave) between treated and nontreated
observations.11
The idea behind of propensity score method is that conditional independence and
common support assumption imply that “whereas one conditional on X in traditional
matching estimators, in propensity score matching estimators on conditions on the
propensity score, because observations with the same propensity score have the same
distribution of covariates, X” (Mocan and Tekin, 2002). Therefore:
LFPi ┴ ti / p(Xi) and 0 < Prob(ti = 1 /p( Xi)) < 1
The first step of the method is the estimation of a logistic regression to estimate
the propensity score. “Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) defines a propensity score as a
function of the vector X, such that Xi ┴ ti / p(Xi), i.e., conditional on the propensity score,
the covariates are independent of assignment to treatment.” (Mocan and Tekin, 2002).
Therefore, the distribution of the variables in vector X should be the same across treated
and nontreated for observations with the same propensity score, known as Balance
Property.
The second step involves the estimation of the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT). Following (Mocan and Tekin, 2002), the ATT estimation can be specified
as:
E(Δi / ti = 1)    = E{(LFPi = 0, LFPi = 1) / ti = 1}
= E{E{(LFPi = 0, LFPi = 1) / ti = 1, p(Xi)}}
= E{E{LFPi = 1 / ti = 1, p(Xi)}} – E{E{LFPi = 0 / ti = 1, p(Xi)}}
The empirical strategy in this paper chose to estimate the probability of LFPi = 1
(in this context, probability of worker be “on leave”) among workers with similar
propensity score (that in this paper means the probability to work in a formal sector job).
Five groups were defined based on the estimated probability to be a formal sector worker.
Then, for workers in each of these five groups, it was estimated the probability to be on
leave as follows:
LFPij = αj + βZij + γtij + εij (2)
Where vector Z contains health conditions variables. Equation (2) estimates for
workers with the same propensity, the impact of have a formal sector job and then be
covered by the DI benefit, on the probability to be “on leave”. Each of the j equations
estimated consider workers with similar propensity.
6. Results
The Appendix presents the results of the logits estimated. To obtain the
propensity to work in formal sector job, the first step was to estimate a logit separately
for men and women based on their other demographic and labor market characteristics
12.
Table 2 shows that all variables turned out to be significant on the determination of such
probability.
                                                
12 Public sector workers were not included in the sample, only private sector workers.12
Based on these results, workers were classified in five groups based on the
estimated probability or propensity to work in a formal sector job. As it was expected,
workers with higher propensity to be a formal sector worker are more educated and
perform their activities in the manufacturing sector or services sector. Moreover, they
tend to have better health conditions and have a smaller chance to not have performed
recently some activity for health reasons.
The next step to access the disincentive impact of the social security system is to
estimate the LFP or, more specifically, the probability to be “on leave”, among workers
with the same propensity to be formal sector workers. The Balance Property, which
requires that the distribution of the variables in vector of exogenous variables should be
the same across formal (treated) and informal (nontreated) sector workers for
observations with the same propensity score, seems to be satisfied (see Table 4).
The results for the estimation of the probability to be “on leave” controlling for
worker’s health conditions can be observed in Table 5 and they suggest the existence of
disincentives created by the Disability System. Among workers with the same propensity
to be in the formal sector, the ones truly occupied in formal jobs have higher probability
to be “on leave”. For the five different groups based on the probability to work as a
formal worker, to actually have a formal sector job increases the probability to be “on
leave” in more than 1.1 points (results go from 1.11 and 1.22 depending on the propensity
to be in the formal sector).
7. Conclusions
This paper took advantage of the high proportion of informal sector workers,
uncovered by the social security system, to analyze the impact of such system on the
labor force participation of Brazilian workers. After controlling for the demographic and
labor market characteristics, informal sector workers would be a control group for formal
sector workers covered by the social security system.
To deal with the endogeneity of the variable which identify formal and informal
sector workers in a single LFP equation estimation, the probability to be “on leave” was
estimated separately for workers with the same propensity to work in a formal sector job.
The results reveal that workers in the formal sector have higher probability to be
on leave, even after controlling for health conditions, which suggests the degree of
disincentive created by such social protection system.
According to Dehejia and Wahba (2002) there is a range of methods to evaluate
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which employ different matching
methods. The application of such matching methods will be the next step of this research,
allowing the measurement of this ATT.13
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Appendix
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics - Formal x Informal
Formal Informal Formal % Informal % Formal % Informal %
Male 19.843.138 21.036.929 61,97 62,40 48,54 51,46
Female 12.177.417 12.676.099 38,03 37,60 49,00 51,00
Married 19.811.117 19.607.497 61,87 58,16 50,26 49,74
White 19.942.402 15.454.052 62,28 45,84 56,34 43,66
Education
less than 1 year 1.575.411 5.228.891 4,92 15,51 23,15 76,85
between 1 and 4 years 5.446.696 10.066.710 17,01 29,86 35,11 64,89
between 5 and 8 years 7.700.943 9.840.833 24,05 29,19 43,90 56,10
between 9 and 14 years 13.688.787 7.639.372 42,75 22,66 64,18 35,82
15 years or more 3.608.717 933.851 11,27 2,77 79,44 20,56
Ocupation
Managers 2.769.778 923.737 8,65 2,74 74,99 25,01
Scientists and Artists 2.455.977 1.166.471 7,67 3,46 67,80 32,20
Techinicians 2.926.679 1.547.428 9,14 4,59 65,41 34,59
Administrative services workers 4.383.614 1.139.500 13,69 3,38 79,37 20,63
Services employees 6.359.282 7.871.992 19,86 23,35 44,69 55,31
Salesman 2.923.477 4.426.521 9,13 13,13 39,78 60,22
Rural workers 1.732.312 7.501.149 5,41 22,25 18,76 81,24
Industry employees 8.431.012 9.102.518 26,33 27,01 48,09 51,91
Militaries 25.616 6.743 0,08 0,02 79,16 20,84
Other ocupations 9.606 20.228 0,03 0,06 32,20 67,80
Sector
Agriculture 1.789.949 7.548.347 5,59 22,39 19,17 80,83
Manufacturing 422.671 134.852 1,32 0,40 75,81 24,19
Transf. Manufacturing 6.839.591 3.718.547 21,36 11,03 64,78 35,22
Construction 1.450.531 3.590.437 4,53 10,65 28,77 71,23
Sales 6.721.114 6.631.353 20,99 19,67 50,34 49,66
Food and Lodging 1.155.942 1.432.804 3,61 4,25 44,65 55,35
Transport and Communication 2.170.994 1.476.631 6,78 4,38 59,52 40,48
Public Administration 1.127.124 347.244 3,52 1,03 76,45 23,55
Health and Education 3.509.453 1.129.386 10,96 3,35 75,65 24,35
Household 1.809.161 4.345.609 5,65 12,89 29,39 70,61
Other Services 1.082.295 1.746.335 3,38 5,18 38,26 61,74
Other Sectors 3.919.316 1.442.918 12,24 4,28 73,09 26,91
Non Defined Sectors 19.212 171.936 0,06 0,51 10,05 89,95
Family
Couple without children 3.938.528 3.843.285 12,30 11,40 50,61 49,39
Couple with children younger than 14 years old 9.004.180 8.296.776 28,12 24,61 52,04 47,96
Couple with children older than 14 years old 7.880.259 7.504.520 24,61 22,26 51,22 48,78
Couple with children younger and older than 14 years old 3.948.134 5.474.996 12,33 16,24 41,90 58,10
Couple with children (unknow age) 0 0 0,00 0,00 - -
Women with children younger than 14 years old 918.990 1.173.213 2,87 3,48 43,92 56,08
Women with children older than 14 years old 2.875.446 3.067.886 8,98 9,10 48,38 51,62
Women with children younger and older than 14 years old 541.147 984.420 1,69 2,92 35,47 64,53
Women with children (unknow age) 0 3.371 0,00 0,01 0,00 100,00
Other families 2.910.668 3.364.560 9,09 9,98 46,38 53,62
No activity for health reasons 1.585.017 2.154.262 4,95 6,39 42,39 57,61
Health Conditions
Excelent 8.805.653 6.799.918 27,50 20,17 56,43 43,57
Goog 18.280.535 18.437.655 57,09 54,70 49,79 50,21
Regular 4.476.474 7.389.896 13,98 21,92 37,72 62,28
Poor 387.449 940.593 1,21 2,79 29,17 70,83
Very Poor 70.445 138.223 0,22 0,41 33,76 66,24
Not declared 0 3.371 0,00 0,01 0,00 100,0015
Table 2 - Logit Prob( Formal )
estimate std error estimate std error
Intercept -2,160 0,004 -1,524 0,004
Age 0,002 0,000 -0,008 0,000
Age squared 0,000 0,000 0,007 0,000
Nonwhite 0,086 0,001 0,075 0,001
Education 0,092 0,000 0,104 0,000
In school -0,483 0,001 -0,407 0,001
Married 0,080 0,001 0,606 0,001
Children younger than 6 -0,101 0,001 - -
North -0,522 0,003 -0,531 0,002
Northeast -0,548 0,002 -0,523 0,002
Southeast 0,279 0,002 0,381 0,001
South 0,418 0,002 0,381 0,002
Metropolitan Area 0,131 0,001 0,113 0,001
Agriculture 0,656 0,010 0,177 0,005
Manufacturing 0,987 0,002 1,416 0,004
Construction 1,021 0,008 -0,365 0,004
Sales 1,028 0,002 0,431 0,004
Food and Lodging 0,571 0,002 -0,112 0,004
Transport and Communication 1,379 0,004 0,629 0,004
Public Administration 1,626 0,003 1,669 0,004
Health and Education 1,627 0,002 1,155 0,004
Other Services and Sectors 0,519 0,002 0,461 0,004
Managers 1,037 0,003 0,642 0,002
Scientists and Artists 0,364 0,003 -0,187 0,002
Techinicians 0,612 0,003 -0,009 0,002
Administrative services workers 1,440 0,003 1,011 0,002
Services employees 0,561 0,002 0,622 0,001
Salesman -0,244 0,003 -0,190 0,002
Rural workers -0,387 0,010 -0,634 0,003
Female Male16
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics
P r o b f  =  1P r o b f  =  2P r o b f  =  3P r o b f  =  4P r o b f  =  5
Formal 11,88 30,44 50,83 70,17 85,12
Education
less than 1 year 40,75 11,02 4,11 1,5 0,09
between 1 and 4 years 39,88 38,96 20,92 11,27 1,78
between 5 and 8 years 16,43 33,88 34,31 25,84 13,08
between 9 and 14 years 2,94 15,86 38,11 48,73 59,86
15 years or more 0 0,28 2,54 12,66 25,19
Married 53,89 58,75 58,86 61,37 68,81
Ocupation
Managers 0,05 0,6 2,71 10,17 18,8
Scientists and Artists 0,17 1,24 5,12 11,11 10,78
Techinicians 0,32 2,03 7 14,13 10,42
Administrative services workers 0,01 0,19 2,46 13,22 35,74
Services employees 16,22 30,09 26,53 18,42 9,01
Salesman 9,68 16,38 19,15 4,67 0,36
Rural workers 55,51 19,42 2,44 0,28 0,01
Industry employees 18,04 30,03 34,5 27,81 14,68
Militaries 0 0 0,01 0,09 0,2
Other ocupations 0 0,02 0,08 0,1 0,01
Sector
Agriculture 55,39 19,57 2,81 0,49 0,05
Manufacturing 0,02 0,12 0,66 1,58 2,23
Transf. Manufacturing 1,96 7,11 17,28 23,71 33,96
Construction 14,61 16,08 5,04 0,76 0,27
Sales 9,23 20,23 31,31 20,55 13,55
Food and Lodging 2,09 5,01 6,7 3,31 0,31
Transport and Communication 0,68 3,32 7,52 9,1 5,83
Public Administration 0,01 0,15 1,11 3,66 8,31
Health and Education 0 0,43 3,34 12,23 25,36
Household 14,77 21,77 6,67 0,32 0,01
Other Services 0,87 3,43 7,56 5,8 1,63
O t h e r  S e c t o r s 0 , 3 32 , 4 89 , 4 41 8 , 28 , 3 9
Non Defined Sectors 0,04 0,31 0,55 0,31 0,08
No activity for health reasons 7,49 6,7 5,49 4,55 4,04
Health Conditions
Excelent 15,55 17,99 23,94 28,91 34,8
Goog 53,49 55,5 57,02 56,89 55,46
Regular 26,34 23,24 17,05 13,05 9,08
Poor 4,12 2,78 1,69 0,98 0,53
Very Poor 0,47 0,48 0,3 0,17 0,12
Not declared 0,01 0,01 0 0 0,01
OBS: Probf = 1 - 0 < Prob(Formal) < 0,2
         Probf = 2 - 0,2 < Prob(Formal) < 0,4
         Probf = 3 - 0,4 < Prob(Formal) < 0,6
         Probf = 4 - 0,6 < Prob(Formal) < 0,8
         Probf = 5 - 0,8 < Prob(Formal) < 1,017
Table 4 - Balance Property (%)
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Education
less than 1 year 37,43 41,19 11,65 10,75 4,77 3,43 1,51 1,47 0,1 0
between 1 and 4 years 43,32 39,41 38,98 38,94 20,71 21,14 11,62 10,46 1,75 1,97
between 5 and 8 years 15,43 16,56 30,31 35,45 31,14 37,6 24,96 27,94 12,53 16,21
between 9 and 14 years 3,78 2,83 18,63 14,65 40,33 35,82 48,54 49,18 59,6 61,34
15 years or more 0,04 0 0,42 0,21 3,05 2,01 13,38 10,96 26,02 20,49
Not Married 45,57 46,19 41,3 41,22 42,38 39,86 38,21 39,63 30,24 36,64
Married 54,43 53,81 58,7 58,78 57,62 60,14 61,79 60,37 69,76 63,36
Ocupation
Managers 0,08 0,05 0,72 0,55 3,12 2,29 10,54 9,28 18,49 20,59
Scientists and Artists 0,21 0,17 1,11 1,3 4,98 5,26 11,2 10,91 11,09 8,99
Techinicians 0,84 0,25 2,45 1,84 7,3 6,69 13,76 15,02 10,4 10,54
Administrative services workers 0,02 0,01 0,22 0,17 2,65 2,26 14,18 10,97 35,86 35,11
Services employees 19,75 15,74 32,2 29,16 25,23 27,87 17,82 19,81 8,8 10,18
Salesman 6,24 10,14 15,62 16,71 20,17 18,09 4,4 5,32 0,37 0,28
Rural workers 47,96 56,53 18,97 19,62 2,22 2,66 0,28 0,28 0,01 0
Industry employees 24,9 17,12 28,7 30,62 34,24 34,77 27,66 28,17 14,81 13,89
Militaries 0 0 0 0 0,02 0 0,12 0,03 0,16 0,42
Other ocupations 0 0 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,11 0,05 0,2 0,01 0
Sector
Agriculture 47,94 56,39 19,21 19,73 2,55 3,07 0,45 0,59 0,06 0,03
Manufacturing 0,04 0,01 0,11 0,13 0,65 0,68 1,75 1,18 2,42 1,13
Transf. Manufacturing 1,99 1,96 7,41 6,97 17,32 17,23 23,82 23,45 34,63 30,12
Construction 21,69 13,66 14,83 16,63 4,35 5,76 0,84 0,56 0,25 0,41
Sales 6,60 9,59 19,56 20,52 32,32 30,27 20,01 21,83 13,78 12,26
Food and Lodging 1,75 2,13 5,21 4,92 6,68 6,73 3,12 3,75 0,32 0,25
Transport and Communication 0,43 0,72 2,58 3,64 7,97 7,07 9,25 8,75 5,89 5,50
Public Administration 0,00 0,01 0,36 0,06 1,47 0,75 3,97 2,93 7,73 11,66
Health and Education 0,02 0,00 0,82 0,26 4,04 2,61 12,29 12,07 24,93 27,77
Household 17,45 14,41 22,75 21,34 5,54 7,85 0,25 0,46 0,00 0,05
Other Services 0,73 0,89 2,10 4,01 4,87 10,33 4,56 8,72 1,42 2,85
Other Sectors 1,36 0,19 5,02 1,36 12,14 6,66 19,62 14,85 8,52 7,69
Non Defined Sectors 0,00 0,05 0,03 0,43 0,09 1,02 0,07 0,85 0,05 0,26
No activity for health reasons 6,63 7,61 6,53 6,77 5,33 5,65 4,49 4,69 3,89 4,92
Health Conditions
Excelent 15,71 15,53 18,96 17,57 24,90 22,94 29,54 27,43 34,97 33,82
Goog 58,42 52,82 57,42 54,66 58,09 55,91 57,07 56,45 55,61 54,57
Regular 21,97 26,93 21,09 24,18 15,47 18,69 12,26 14,89 8,80 10,72
Poor 3,27 4,24 2,15 3,05 1,31 2,08 0,96 1,03 0,48 0,82
Very Poor 0,63 0,45 0,38 0,53 0,22 0,38 0,17 0,19 0,13 0,07
Not declared 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00
OBS: Probf = 1 - 0 < Prob(Formal) < 0,2
         Probf = 2 - 0,2 < Prob(Formal) < 0,4
         Probf = 3 - 0,4 < Prob(Formal) < 0,6
         Probf = 4 - 0,6 < Prob(Formal) < 0,8
         Probf = 5 - 0,8 < Prob(Formal) < 1,0
Probf = 5 Probf = 1 Probf = 2 Probf = 3 Probf = 418
Table 5 - Logit Prob( On Leave )
estimate std error estimate std error estimate std error estimate std error estimate std error
Intercept -5,298 0,010 -5,680 0,008 -5,687 0,007 -5,599 0,007 -5,903 0,012
Formal 1,149 0,007 1,210 0,004 1,220 0,005 1,158 0,006 1,110 0,011
Female -0,322 0,007 -0,026 0,004 0,236 0,004 0,203 0,004 0,565 0,005
No activity for health reasons 1,890 0,007 1,903 0,005 2,087 0,005 2,276 0,005 2,132 0,006
Goog Health Condition 0,180 0,011 0,426 0,008 0,153 0,006 0,083 0,005 0,235 0,007
Regular Health Condition 0,514 0,012 1,078 0,008 0,987 0,007 0,878 0,006 1,086 0,008
Poor Health Condition 1,607 0,013 1,873 0,010 1,688 0,009 1,842 0,009 2,097 0,015
Very Poor Health Condition 0,143 0,035 1,608 0,017 2,030 0,016 2,337 0,017 2,378 0,026
Estimated Probability
On Leave = 1 1,24672 1,60699 1,79104 1,88369 1,7759
OBS: Probf = 1 - 0 < Prob(Formal) < 0,2
         Probf = 2 - 0,2 < Prob(Formal) < 0,4
         Probf = 3 - 0,4 < Prob(Formal) < 0,6
         Probf = 4 - 0,6 < Prob(Formal) < 0,8
         Probf = 5 - 0,8 < Prob(Formal) < 1,0
Probf = 5 P r o b f  =  1P r o b f  =  2P r o b f  =  3P r o b f  =  4